In part #7 I will look at the role optimism and pessimism as states of mind have to play in how we view the world.
In later blogs I will take you through to what I think is a resolution of the paradox. A way to find meaning where there is none.
#7 Un-reasoned optimism and pessimism
The terms optimism and pessimism suggest nothing like a philosophical creed, still less a speculative philosophy and for this reason I do not class them as a strategy. In common usage the respective terms only denote tempers of mind at opposite ends of a continuum. And this is precisely what they are in their unreasoned or impulsive form. For this reason this section does not constitute a strategy. However, complete theories of the universe exist for each view in their reasoned form which more properly should describe as weltanschauung. For example, Schopenhauer furnished us with a reasoned philosophy of pessimism based upon what he considered to be empirical grounds of deduction. In Leibniz we find a reasoned optimism. It is these reasoned views I shall consider in the next two chapters but it is important at this stage to make the distinction between unreasoned and reasoned views.
In their unreasoned or impulsive form neither optimism nor pessimism are a permanent temper of mind; we wax and wane becoming at one moment optimistic and the next pessimistic. Any number of factors may of course contribute to these shifts, yet we are neither always one nor the other. And even though a mature personality may lean toward one extreme or the other (Keats and Byron typify the respective emphasis), nevertheless they remain in this impulsive form unreasoned views of the world.
Much unreasoned pessimism is to be found in poetry, the Bible and Greek literature. Byron is an example already mentioned as were the earlier Biblical references to Ecclesiastes, i.2 & i.3. With regards to Greek literature, unreasoned complaints about human life frequently gave voice to their grievance. Theognis’s (fl.544-541 BC) unreasoned pessimism is evident when he writes ‘It would be best for the children of the earth not to be born ... next best for them, when born, to pass the gates of Hades as soon as possible.’ A little later we get Sophocles (c. 496-405 BC) in one of his less tragic dramas writing; ‘Not to be born is the most reasonable, but having seen the light the next best thing is to go thither whence one came as soon as possible.’
In contrast to this pessimism we find in Voltaire’s Candide the irrepressible optimism of Pangloss. When asked by Candide whether after having been ‘“hanged, dissected, racked with blows, and rowing in the galleys, did [he] still think all was for the very best?”’ He replied. ‘“I am still of my first opinion”’.
These unreasoned views and, more importantly, their inadequacy as coping strategies, is further illustrated in a report on sixties culture and its influence on British university adult education. This report concluded that the optimism of the sixties had largely evaporated leading in some instances to a ‘retreat into quietism’. Whilst optimism could not be said to be completely dead there was nonetheless reported a widespread loss of belief in the efficacy of adult education as a means of changing the world. As one respondent put it; ‘the difference between then and now is that then I believed it could make some difference; now I have no conception that anything I do will make the slightest bit of difference.’ These feelings are common among many who, now apparently fortified by a new ‘realism’, no longer believe they can make a difference. In other words, an unreasoned view (optimistic) is unable to sustain activity for all but the easily attainable ends, eventually wilting under the strain of doubt.
Having hopefully given expression to the form these unreasoned views may take I shall now briefly examine a few general characteristics relating to optimism and pessimism prior to considering their reasoned counterparts as weltanschauung in the next two chapters.
Neither optimism nor pessimism can be understood without reference to their respective antithetic modes of belief. Neither can they be considered in isolation from their influence upon the foregoing strategies. Moreover, both optimism and pessimism may lead to differences in the extent to which they are expressed. That is to say, in either case the individual may be concerned only with himself, or with some single aspect of human life, or with the whole of existence. These might be regarded as individual, particular, or universal outlooks. Yet regardless of the extent the impulse remains the same in all cases.
In addition, despite their opposing conceptions both the optimist and the pessimist have their ideal view of the world; they just differ in their way of looking at this ideal. For the optimist, all is possibility and certainty; hence, even though present conditions may not be satisfactory they believe them to be only temporary and alterable. In contrast the pessimist uses his ideal view of the world as a means to highlight the worthlessness of present reality. So what is temporary and alterable to the optimist is final and unalterable to the pessimist. This distinction should also be borne in mind when we consider reasoned optimism and pessimism in the two chapters to follow.
In concluding this necessary digression it is recognised that while unreasoned optimism and pessimism are to be found throughout history they lack the exactness of observation and rational calculation that might qualify them as a reasoned view. To constitute a reasoned view there must at least be a semblance of verity for the believer. This is only possible if both sides of the equation are considered prior to concluding upon a preponderance of one over the other. This we might conclude is reasoned optimism and pessimism in contrast to the laudative optimism and invective pessimism described above. Let us now consider reasoned optimism and pessimism as perspectives on the world.
In #8 I will look at reasoned optimism that emphasises an ideal life that is regarded not only as possible but also as depending on conditions which lie mainly, if not exclusively, within our control. Apparently.