It will be tough for the community to be able to vote those self voting whale BPs out. See distribution of whale votes vs community votes below.
http://eos-bp-votes.dapptools.info/s/api/block-producer-votes-stack-html/1/40
I've posted this @daniellarimer on EOSGov on Telegram
"I still think my earlier suggestion of logscaling voting power above 1000EOS will be an effective way to prevent whales voting themselves as BP in and not putting the work and mia from ECAF meetings. This way, if a whale wishes to self-vote, then let them tediously split and try to manage thousands of accounts, each with still a substantial amount of EOS if they wise to maximize their voting power. They will of course have to then make sure to keep all those accounts active, and revote constantly to keep themselves as BP.
Adding on to my post earlier about log scaling, another suggestion I had made previously on top of this is to introduce a criteria whereby a minimum of independent voters would need to be met. Could even throw in a geographical diversity of voters requirement. Its not fool proof, but adds layers of tediousness and hopefully also cost against self voting whales.
More layers of anti-oligarchy protection could be gradually introduced, and to create a more democratically balanced ecosystem, where even those with 100 EOS tokens have some say (against the whales)."
People with higher financial stake in EOS will still get higher voting power. Whales with one million coins will have six times the voting power compared to those with one coin for a log10 scaling function. Could switch to other types of log scaling or other less harsh functions too, to find the balance btwn financial stake based voting-power and the threat of massive whales being able to control the system by virtue of the resource they have to bend it to their will.
Also if any whale is caught trying to game the system, and if they get hacked while trying to bot managed their thousands of accounts, then make it such that their funds will risk being burned with accord to the constitution.
We need to start somewhere. Implement these layers to make it difficult and requiring more effort for whales to game the system, study it, come up with more solutions, and add to and improve the existing protection gradually, inch by inch, etc. But somethings needs to be done against self-voting whales now than later.
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Basically my suggestion was simply to force self-voting whales into risking their investments (i.e. needing to manage their funds across thousands of addresses via bots) + the effort needed to to ensure those self-votes appear sufficiently diversified different regions of the world, and so on
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And finally, I believe a more effective solution to consider is to modify the voting mechanics by limiting renewed votes completely to only BP candidates below the top 21, which will force BPs to rotate!
i.e. when people renew their votes, they will have to consider alt BPs.. hence more BPs will have a chance of earning more to maintain their servers, plus each BPs (standby/active) can be trailed and tested by the community over time and their performances be gauged during their active phase.
It could perhaps also be made such that voters would not be able to vote for BPs that have been in the top 21 position for more than 3 mths for a period (say 3mths or even 6 mths).
Or perhaps the above could be relaxed a bit by making it compulsory for people to spend 2/3 of their votes on BPs below the top 21 instead.
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Clarification (again): This certainly is not intended as a perfect solution, but a start towards fighting back, and increasing the risk of self-voting as the whales will then have to resort to bot manage their crazy number of split accounts to maximize their voting power, and probably with some cost too. And on top of it, other layers of discouraging self-voting by whales have been suggested, and more can be added to and built on top of it, and evolve as we go.
~ transhumanio @eos