Problem: Lack of Historic HBD Stability

HBD is intended to be a stablecoin. Historically, particularly as SBD, it has not achieved this very well. It doesn't fluctuate as wildly as other low liquidity cryptocurrencies, but it is not stable enough to fulfill its purpose. Here are some historic price graphs to illustrate the point:

The above should just be flat green lines if SBD/HBD was functioning as a stablecoin.

Solution: Low trust market maker accounts funded by Hive DAO

Ideally, we could develop a completely automated, trustless market maker which can be funded at will by stakeholders from the DAO. I think this is the ideal solution, but perhaps it is a lot of development work needed to do this.

A solution that would require much less development work, as far as I can see, is to have special low-trust accounts which can operate as market makers. My idea is to add an option for creating accounts that are treated by the network rules as low-trust market maker workers. These accounts should have the bare minimum allowed transactions to function. They can make transfers - but only to the DAO. They can receive funds as normal. They can change their keys, and they can make orders on the internal market, as those are required to perform their functions. They cannot transfer to anyone but the DAO.

These market makers are not completely trustless because they still may never give the money back to the DAO*, and they could make intentionally poor trades on the internal market, wasting DAO money and benefiting other internal market traders. However, their ability to profit at the network expense in the case that they are not trustworthy should be pretty limited as long as there are enough participants in the internal market.

Advantages of market makers:

1. They should assist in stabilizing the price of HBD, by selling when HBD is high and buying when it is low. HBD supply can be constrained by the MM when price is low, and made more available when price is high by this mechanism.
2. Increase liquidity on internal market.
3. They should generally make a profit which can be returned for the DAO. If they don't profit, it will simply be the cost of helping to achieve 1 above.

* perhaps there could be an additional rule allowing the low-trust MM accounts to have their funds returned to the DAO, I guess it depends on how much work that would be

Broader idea:

A more generalized version of this proposal would be to allow the creation of limited permission accounts - where you set what transactions are allowed upon account creation and define a whitelist of accounts it can transfer to. Thus you can have such low permission accounts for various special DAO purposes. Perhaps also a flag that indicates the account value can be force transferred to accounts on a whitelist, given certain conditions.