Open Archive Challenge

• Search the various archives at listed above or introduce
  new open source in your submission
• Find an overlooked, underrated, underreported or obscure leak/ email/ cable/ document/ court filing on a topic that interests you.
• Build a post around your findings
• Provide additional sources to make your case and strengthen your position
• Explain the significance of the material and why it’s an important piece of news that should be communicated to the public.
  
  If you’re having trouble finding a focus, here's a list of search terms you may want to incorporate into your research
  
• Bioweapon
• BioWeapons Anti-Terrorism Act
• Emergency Powers Act
• Emergency Management
• Corona virus
• Influenza
• Killer pathogens
• Fort Detrick
• Ebola
• H1N1
• MERS
• SARS
• Wuhan
• BSL-4 (Biosafety Level 4)
• Biological warfare
• Bioterrorism
• US Bioweapons program
• Chinese Bioweapons program
• UN Biological Weapons Convention
• etc.
  
  
  

These are simply suggestions, you are free to conduct research into any field of interest relating to the subject matter.

Rules

• Help spread the word, reblog this post
• Limited to 2 contest entries per account
• Submissions must be made in a separate post (not in the comments)
• Submissions must be posted before the deadline at the end of Easter (UTC - Monday, April 13th 2020, UTC 11.59.00PM)
• This research challenge is open for two weeks
• Please make sure to post or cross-post to the “deepdives” community page
• Indicate that your post is a DD17 entree in the title of your post (so we don't miss it)
• Your entry must include references to a document/documents found in the a publicly available archive
• Provide a link to the specific document or page
• Make an attempt to keep your post concise and to the point
• You may leave a link to your entry in the comments below
  
• Please, do not plagiarize the work of others
  
  

Winners

The Winning Post Should

• Meet the rules criteria
• Winners will be announced 72hrs after the submission deadline (we will certainly try)
• Well researched
• Fully sourced
• Clearly presented
• Original Content (not widely reported on in the media)
• Significance should be clearly articulated
• 3 Outstanding contributions will be acknowledged
  
  

Prizes

1st Prize = 30 Hive

2nd Prize = 12.5 Hive

3rd Prize = 7.5 Hive

• The current prize pool is 50 Hive to be divided between the top 3 submissions.
• Liquid HIVE (or HBD) earned by the original contest post will be added to the prize pool
• Example: 100 Hive – 1st place = 50% // 2nd = 30% // 3rd = 20%
• Bonus @v4vapid & @ausbitbank upvotes and reblogs for exceptional and/or original contributions
• Winning post(s) will be pinned to the Deep Dives Community page
  HP earned from challenge announcements and the winner’s announcements will go to the community account @deepdives
  
  

  Contributions

  
  

  Those that do not ‘win’ should not view their work and efforts as being wasted. All submissions are valuable and will be contributing to building a body of research on the blockchain. We hope that contributors support each other’s efforts wherever possible whether by sharing tips, links or through constructive feedback to their fellow researchers.
  
  
  Be sure to check out some of the great work done by Deep Dives contributors. Past winners and contributors include:
  
  @palikari123, @krnel, @geke, @bifiracoil, @thoughts-in-time, @direrat, @an0nkn0wledge, @gregorypatrick, @natepower, @deliberator, @angryman, @elchacal6, @richq11, @tarazkp, @valued-customer, @v4vapid.

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  Good luck and happy digging!
  

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  Deep Dives Community

  
  

  
  

  Deep Dives Aims

  • Promote original content
  • Promote investigative journalism
  • Promote focused and quality research
  • Encourage community engagement
  • Encourage collaboration and teamwork
  • Recognize and reward high quality original content
    
    
    Over time, Deep Dives aims to build a repository of high quality research and original content preserved on the blockchain.
    
    We hope you join us in building this unique resource.
    It truly is a community effort and your exceptional contributions are what fuels this project.
    
    

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  *NEW FEATURE

  Open Source (recommended links and leads)

  
  

  @activistpost/us-biowarfare-act-author-studies-confirm-coronavirus-weaponized

  https://web.archive.org/web/20200214144447/https://www.researchgate.net/publication/339070128_The_possible_origins_of_2019-nCoV_coronavirus

  https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0166354220300528

  https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4797993/

  https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00705-010-0729-6

  
  

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  (Additional links to be added periodically)

  New Additions

  2015 - South Korea MERS emerged out of the Pentagon Biowarfare Labs

  https://www.21cir.com/2015/06/south-korea-mers-emerged-out-of-the-pentagons-biowarfare-labs-2/
  

  CDC Inspection Findings Reveal More about Fort Detrick Research Suspension

  https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/11/24/cdc-inspection-findings-reveal-more-about-fort-detrick-research-suspension.html

  BATS, GENE EDITING AND BIOWEAPONS: RECENT DARPA EXPERIMENTS RAISE CONCERNS AMID CORONAVIRUS OUTBREAK

  The Pentagon Bio Weapons

  http://dilyana.bg/the-pentagon-bio-weapons/

  https://archive.is/bXFSr

  
  

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  Wikileaks (2009) - The World at Risk Report - Will It Make a Difference? PartOne of Three

  https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/11/1195801_-us-ascii-q-the_world_at_risk_report_.html

  
  

  Biological Weapons

  Biological weapons (BW) sometimes referred to as poor man's nukes, are disease-causing microbes - pathogens - viruses, parasites, fungus or bacteria, or the toxins that they produce. In the truest sense of the term when these pathogens are used as a military weapon, they get refined and processed for optimal delivery to cause death to people, animals or crops, i.e. living things, or to disable groups. Many of the pathogens or their toxins are readily found in nature. Typically a "weaponized" pathogen - one that has been adapted for intentional use - is potentially more dangerous than naturally occurring ones. However that distinction is often academic. Consider pneumonic plague - a naturally occurring illness caused by the bacterium Yersinia pestis - untreated it is a virtual death sentence.

  Pathogens, like other weapons have distinct characteristics that both influence their suitability for selection, as well as assist in diagnosing them, such as

  
  

  1. The incubation period - the time from exposure to the development of clinical illness. Some pathogens or toxins can cause illness within hours; others require several days.

  2. Infectivity, which underscores the pathogens ability to infect a host (and the type of vulnerable host). Some viruses, for example, are highly host specific, like monkeypox, but crossover to humans is possible, as was seen in Wisconsin in 2003.

  3. Transmissibility, which can be thought of in the broadest sense as contagion (can be spread person to person) or non contagion. Some bioweapon illness can be spread person to person such as smallpox, while others like inhalation anthrax illness, cannot (at least the natural forms).

  4. Virulence is the likelihood of causing severe disease; plague, Ebola, inhalation anthrax and ricin toxin are all capable of causing death in a high percent of those exposed.

  5. Persistence is how long the pathogen can survive in the environment (and the type of conditions to eradicate it). Anthrax spores are very hearty and can survive extreme outdoor conditions.

  Biological agents have been further classified as Category A (most deadly and likely to cause widespread harm), B and C. Anthrax is considered one of the prototypical Category A biological weapons - it is found in nature as well as numerous research labs worldwide, is capable of causing several distinct patterns of illness, and in the most severe forms (inhalational, gastrointestinal) unless treated early, carries a high case fatality rate, and as a hearty bacteria, persistent in the environment.

  Bioweapons such as brucellosis were used in WWI against the animals critical to the war effort. Russia is said to have more scientists working on plague (Yersinia pestis) than the U.S. has on its entire bioweapons program. And, it remains shrouded in secrecy behind layers of Russian military, political intelligence apparatus and denial. Outside examination is limited. Russia is rarely forthcoming about anything relating to their security: when the Former Soviet Union had a small release of bioweapon anthrax in Sverdlovsk, resulting in deaths, denial was the watch word until information leaked out. Relying upon a nation that aggressively guards its secrets, even while not necessarily protecting its facilities, is a weakness in global limitation of WMD diversion, theft or proliferation.

  Numerous other nations have bioweapons programs, too. Relatively easy to procure and develop, it is a growing global threat. Some of these countries, as you can imagine, do not have a great incentive to destroy their stockpiles, since the objective - regional domination or countering the threat of an adversary - make it unlikely biological weapons will go away any time soon.

  Bioterrorism (BT) is the intentional use of microbes or their toxins to cause harm to humans and other living organisms, to influence the conduct of government, to intimidate or coerce a civilian population. Clearly the anthrax events of 2001 demonstrated the potential impact a biological can cause. Consider the "white powder" events and changes in how the mail is handled at high value facilities! Consider the millions of people affected by the "fear factor" even though 22 actually became ill and five died. But a biological was used in 1984 as the Rajneesh cult spread salmonella bacteria at salad bars in the hope of sickening enough local citizens to keep them from turning out to vote! Over 700 were sickened. Moreover, it took almost a year before public health officials, local health care professionals and law enforcement could put all the pieces together and determine these illnesses were part of a concerted effort.

  Biological weapons, if dispersed in a large, unvaccinated or unprotected (i.e. susceptible) population, will result in numerous illnesses, deaths, perhaps disfigurement (smallpox) or disability. If the target is agriculture - the impact economically as well as to society could be significant. Regardless of the target, it will undermine public confidence in the government, and result in a rush on health care facilities from the worried well in addition to the potentially sick.

  And herein rests one of the critical challenges in addressing biological weapons: unless the pathogen is released in proximity to a detector capable of real time detection (not widely available), biological weapons are stealth weapons! The size of dust particles at best...there will not be a bang, mushroom cloud or puff of purple smoke to announce the release! No noise, no notice. This also makes it hard to identify the perpetrator.

  S/he is long gone by the time anyone figures it out. The "event" has occurred and everyone has left the scene, while the incubation clock still ticks away! A common exposure may not result in all victims presenting at the same time at the same health care facility. So not only will the physician have to correctly diagnose the patient, s/he will have to communicate it in live time to other health care facilities in the locality and, if anyone has left the area....even nationwide or regionally. Such communication often relying upon the efficiency of the local health department - public health capacity is inconsistent nationwide, from agencies such as Los Angeles or New York City being blessed with well trained professionals and significant expertise, to thers which have poorly trained directors with few resources. Another example of a government enterprise that has had so much mission creep as to be all but useless in many regions, but more on this in a future article.

  Of additional concern is the number of laboratories nationwide and worldwide that are conducting research on naturally occurring deadly pathogens, as well as genetically altered ones. Research labs handling deadly pathogens are labeled based upon their biosecurity level (BSL) - from "1" being the least secure and dedicated to relatively low risk pathogens, to "4,"+++ which contain the most deadly forms; those without known cures. These facilities, including BSL 3 are not nearly as well secured as they should be. As reported in The WaR Report agents of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found several BSL 3 and 4 labs that had several security vulnerabilities.

  But here's the sobering reality - while it takes resources and expertise to refine a naturally occurring pathogen for advanced or military bioweapon applications, the vast array of these microbes, if obtained and processed properly, could result in less elegant but no less deadly weapons against an unprotected civilian population. Sick people can become weapons in and of themselves if the disease is contagious. Given our inability to secure the borders, and airport security is weak in terms of identifying biological or chemical threats - a terrorist extremist turned passenger with a passport, sick with plague or carrying a simple dispersal atomizer could cause a bit of angst!

  Al Qaeda has made no secret about wanting biological and nuclear weapons.

  Other cults have experimented with bioweapons. And as the proliferation of these materials, the encroachment of remote lands with global expansion and easy travel between nations increases, so does the risk.

  Take home message on biological weapon illness - if we cannot limit malefactors access to deadly pathogens, do not prevent the event, and cannot diagnose the subsequent illness early.....don't make any long term plans.

  
  

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