Source
Last week left an event in the inextricable field of relations between the United States and Cuba that prompts our commentary. Within the pleasure that I generally derive from scrutinizing history, this is a subject that I'm particularly passionate about because of its importance for the political, economic and social development of my country.
The U.S. Government extended last Thursday to citizens of Cuba, Haiti and Nicaragua an immigration initiative first oriented to Venezuela. Since January 6, citizens of these countries may obtain —at the request of a valid sponsor in the United States— a parole to reside and work there for two years. A total of 30,000 individuals, including Venezuelans, are expected to access this benefit on a monthly basis.
Prior to the referred date, Cubans were not subject to the controversial public health order issued in 2020 by the Trump administration —invoking sections 265 and 268 of Title 42 of the U.S. Code—, which greatly restricted access to certain guarantees within the U.S. immigration system. In view of this and other historical conditions, and the severe crisis the country is going through, the influx of Cuban migrants to the U.S. has only increased in recent years.
Until now, the routes used to arrive irregularly to the United States include the risky illegal journey in —usually very unsafe— boats, and crossing at some official point of entry located on the border with Mexico. Both have entailed an economic cost, but above all a human cost —where the most painful are the lives lost— that is difficult to quantify.
Source
According to the Department of Homeland Security instructions, the new process is relatively simple, and there are already reports that it's working. You can get the steps as outlined in the U.S. Federal Register here.
Although we assume that most applicants will be admitted into the program once they obtain an advance travel authorization to the United States from Customs and Border Protection, the Department of Homeland Security notes that all steps are subject to CBP's discretion without appeal options.
My opinion
This program constitutes a mammoth change, a watershed in the U.S.-Cuba relations in the migratory order. Its scope is limited by the number of 30,000 permits to be granted to the countries mentioned above, and also by the fact that it excludes people without access to U.S. sponsors —family, friends or NGO—.
Nevertheless, many Cubans whose families have the capital to support their departure from the country, and who engaged in irregular ways to emigrate, now have the guarantee of a much safer, cheaper, and also relatively fast process. And even more: they will be able to adjust their migratory status through the Cuban Adjustment Act, a legislation that enables an exclusive path to permanent residency in the United States.
Regarding the inexhaustible debate about the causes of migration, I'm convinced that, although the current crisis also touches —as never before— the political consensus, growing dissatisfaction with material well-being is the factor that essentially defines the migratory trend —whatever the ideology or political position—.
In the social drift of recent years in Cuba, beyond the internal errors in the design and implementation of the economic model —which have been many, several of them indefensible—, the U.S. sanctions regime plays a fundamental role.
The Office of Foreign Assets Control itself —attached to the Treasury Department— declared in July 2021 that this sanctions regime is the most comprehensive among all those applied in the world. It would therefore be naïve or unfair to eliminate this variable from the equation that characterizes Cuban development.
The same reasoning applied by the United States when assessing the relation between the lack of opportunities and the migratory phenomenon in the Western Hemisphere, is somehow banned in the Cuban case. Let us review this excerpt from Biden's remarks last Thursday:
Well, [Vice] President Harris led this effort — led this effort to make things better in the countries from which [the migrants] are leaving. And thanks to her leadership, she’s been able to generate more than $3.2 billion from the private sector to create jobs and opportunities in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala to help people stay in their own countries — home countries where it’ll be safer and they have some opportunities.
Months ago, U.S. officials acknowledged that an aid fund directed to Venezuela
could keep [citizens from that country] from fleeing by improving living conditions through better access to food, medicine and health care, and financing infrastructure projects to fix Venezuela's unstable power grid».
Venezuela could very well be exchanged for Cuba in the last sentence, but that will not happen. Perhaps because the island doesn't have the strategic importance of the sudamerican country in the context of the Russian-Ukraine war?
Conclusions
It seems very clear to me that the balance of the decision here reviewed is positive, inasmuch as it favors a safer migration. In addition, we have been able to note the reluctance of U.S. officials to recognize that the rooths of the painful and massive departure of Cuban citizens from the country are not very different, in essence, from those that we can appreciate in other contexts, apart from the deafening rhetoric that usually accompanies the informative routines on Cuba and its political system —many times sponsored by the U.S. government itself, as can be verified in this query via USASpending.gov—.
I will continue to watch for new events that imply a substantial change in the historically tense relations between Cuba and the United States, and other relevant topics. Thank you very much for your attention.