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In part 1, we explored the unending Patriot Act that has severely curtailed civil liberties, solidified key aspects of mass surveillance and the right to privacy, contributed to the militarization of police and laid the groundwork for tighter command and control of the populace throughout American society.
We also saw how the Patriot Act was rushed through both Houses of the United States government without debate in the confusion and panic that followed the September 11th attacks.
While planes crashing into the Twin Towers and the complete collapse of both buildings have been burned into our memories of the events, another separate terrorist attack acted as the catalyst to pass the Patriot Act unobstructed - The Anthrax Attack (Amerithrax).
The Anthrax Attacks of 2001
In case blame for future terrorist attacks wasn't a powerful enough motivator, another act of terrorism quickly emerged in the weeks following 9/11. These attacks were directed at prominent voices in the Democratic party and members of the media.
During the panic and frenzy that followed the September 11th attacks two Senate Democrats, Patrick Leahy and Tom Daschle, who openly intended to scrutinize the Patriot Act legislation, received suspicious packages through the US postal service containing a white powder, later identified as anthrax a lethal biological weapon. Similar packages were sent to Tom Brokaw, the NBC news anchor, and to the editors of the New York Post and National Enquirer publications.
As a result of this act of bioterrorism, 5 people died, including several postal workers, and seventeen other innocent people were either sickened or hospitalized. Another ten thousand individuals deemed to be "at risk" of exposure underwent antibiotic prophylaxis.
Anthrax Attack Chronology
2001
Sept. 18th:
Letters containing anthrax mailed
Oct. 4th:
Photo editor at tabloid publisher America Media hospitalized in Boca Raton, Fla., with inhalation anthrax; dies one day later
Oct. 8th:
Anthrax found in offices of American Media; offices closed
Oct. 9th:
More letters with anthrax mailed; FBI begins investigation
Oct. 12th:
Assistant to NBC anchor Tom Brokaw in New York City tests positive for anthrax after handling contaminated letter
Oct. 15th:
Staff members of Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-S. Dakota) opens anthrax-laced letter mailed from Trenton, N.J.
Oct. 18th:
CBS employee, N.J. postal worker test positive for anthrax
Oct. 23rd:
Authorities say two workers from Washington, D.C., postal facility died of anthrax
Oct. 31:
New York City hospital stockroom worker dies from inhalation anthrax
Nov. 21st:
Elderly woman in Connecticut is 5th person to die of inhalation anthrax
2002
June 25th:
FBI searches home of government scientist Steven Hatfill; later named a "person of interest"
2008
June 27th:
Hatfill wins $5.8 million settlement in suit against Department of Justice
June 29th:
Government scientist Bruce Ivins, under investigation for anthrax, commits suicide
Aug. 6th:
Unsealed government documents show Ivins had anthrax "identical" to what was mailed in letters
McClatchy
NPR
At the height of the anthrax attacks on the American east coast in late 2001, many feared biological weapons had been deployed by Saddman Hussein or Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda. This falsehood was spread throughout media by members of the Bush administration without evidence.
However, it was soon discovered by forensic investigators that the particular anthrax strain used in the attacks bore the signature of US anthrax strains developed domestically in relation to US biological weapons development labs. The epicentre for US biological warfare and deadly virus research is at the USAMRIID at Fort Detrick.
In 2008, investigators concluded that anthrax expert and government military scientist Bruce Ivins was solely responsible for the attacks. The government was in the process of investigating Ivins and were making preparations to indict the scientist when it was reported he committed suicide on July 29th 2008 by ingesting a 'massive amount of prescription Tylenol mixed with codeine'.
The FBI concluded that Ivins, a 'troubled' government employee acting alone, was behind the Anthrax attacks and promptly ended their investigation into the matter.
The complex and multi-faceted investigation lasted 7 years with a price tag of over $100 million dollars. An investigation that resulted in 5 million dollar defamation case paid out to another scientist, Steve Hatfill, who was falsely accused of involvement in the acts of terrorism.
The investigation into the Anthrax attacks centred around the USAMRIID (U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases) at Fort Detrick, Maryland. Special attention was placed on two career scientists who worked at the institute.
Official Findings
Key Aspects
- Early investigations identified the 'Ames' Strain of Ames Anthrax as used in attacks.
- Hatfill worked from 1997-1999 at For Detrick Lab and had unrestricted access to Ames Anthrax.
- Hatfill also filled out numerous prescriptions for Cipro, the drug used to treat Anthrax inhalation (but Cipro also treatment for an unnamed condition Hatfill was suffering from at the time)
- Breakthrough - Ames strain RMR-1029 identified as parent material of anthrax powder used in attacks
- When RMR-1029 was identified, it was concluded Hatfill did not have access to this particular strain of anthrax spores.
- All researchers who had access to USAMRIID lab storing RMR-1029 Ames strain anthrax were thoroughly investigated.
- Time period, individuals with access to RMR-1029: Sept. 11-18, 2001 / Oct.1-8, 2001
- Individuals with access were given polygraph tests, alibis checked, and abilities assessed.
- Searches of workplace, notes, computers, correspondences and homes conducted.
- It was determined that only Bruce Ivins had access to RMR-1029 and the ability to process the spores into dried powdered form used in the attacks.
- Investigators found that during the period of the Anthrax attacks, Ivins had spent time in the lab during late hours, a practice inconsistent with his normal habits.
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/73702-d1-doj-summary-errata-feb-19-2010-13067-13270
https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/amerithrax-or-anthrax-investigation
https://vault.fbi.gov/Amerithrax/
Initially investigators focused on Steve Hatfill but shifted their focus to several other Fort Detrick scientists, including Bruce Ivins, after identifying the strain RMR-1029 as the key to solving the case.
Steven Hatfill
- Scientist at Fort Detrick laboratory - USAMRIID
- Named as "Person of Interest" by FBI
- Filed lawsuit against DOJ stating that investigators violated his privacy rights speaking to reporters about the case.
- Reached $5.82 million settlement
The FBI scrutinized 20-30 people, mostly government scientists, in association with scientific research into anthrax and deadly pathogens. The only person to be publicly identified by the FBI was Steven Hatfill.
The Times said federal investigators moved away from Hatfill and concluded Ivins was the culprit after FBI Director Robert Mueller changed leadership of the investigation in 2006. The new investigators instructed agents to re-examine leads and reconsider potential suspects.
*It's interesting to note that the investigation of the Anthrax case changed focus under the direction of professional cover-up artist and career Deep State operative Robert Mueller, then FBI Director.
Bruce Ivins
- Worked at Fort Detrick for 18 years
- Fort Detrick - USAMRIID
- Army biodefence researcher
- Ivins was one of the nation's leading biodefense researchers.
- Conducted extensive research on inhalation anthrax
- Co-author of numerous anthrax studies, including one on a treatment for inhalation anthrax published in the July 7 issue of the journal Antimicrobial Agents and Chemotherapy
- In 2003, Ivins and two of his colleagues at the USAMRIID received the
highest honor given to Defense Department civilian employees for helping
solve technical problems in the manufacture of anthrax vaccine.
Sources close to the investigation say that Ivins was placed under increasing pressure as his eccentric personality and obsessive behaviour began to raise more suspicion from investigators.
In the six months following the anthrax mailings, Ivins conducted unauthorized testing for anthrax spores outside containment areas at USAMRIID - the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick - and found some, according to an internal report by the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command, which oversees the lab.
In December 2001, after conducting tests triggered by a technician's fears that she had been exposed, Ivins found evidence of anthrax and decontaminated the woman's desk, computer, keypad and monitor, but didn't notify his superiors, according to the report.
The report says Ivins performed more unauthorized sampling on April 15, 2002, and found anthrax spores in his office, in a passbox used for moving materials in and out of labs, and in a room where male workers changed from civilian clothing into laboratory garb.
Ivins told Army investigators he conducted unauthorized tests because he was worried that the powdered anthrax in letters that had been sent to USAMRIID for analysis might not have been adequately contained.
https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/12/1287767_re-ct-anthrax-scientist-commits-suicide-as-fbi-closes-in-.html
As more scrutiny was place on Ivins, investigators began to put together a detailed profile of Ivins detailing how he had the "opportunity" and "motive" and "ability" to produce the deadly strain. Combined with an unflattering psychological profile, evidence from his personal emails and history of obsession and strange behaviour, the FBI determined that they had sufficient evidence to indict the 62 year old biologist.
Under the Microscope: Questioning the Official Story
vital record
The case against Ivins is nowhere near a slam-dunk. In fact, many of Ivins' colleagues believe that the evidence is lacking and that the FBI settled on Ivins out of convenience after an exhaustive and expensive investigation. Investigations by reporters at PBS Frontline, Pro-Publica and McClatchy have suggested that much of the evidence relating to Ivins' guilt is circumstantial and even suggest that the Bureau may have overlooked significant forensic evidence that would contradict their findings.
The Justice Department closed the eight-year investigation, said to cost as much as $100 million. However, none of the circumstantial evidence it found showed that Ivins prepared the deadly powder, scrawled "Death to America" in a seeming mimic of al Qaida, or twice sneaked away on six and a half hour roundtrip drives to drop them in a Princeton, N.J., mailbox.
If the FBI got the right man, then there is no consequence to its decision to stop hunting for bacillus subtilis, a harmless bacterial contaminant that resembles anthrax. But if Ivins was innocent, then the killer is at large, and the bureau may have missed a big opportunity.
Some scientists and ex-colleagues of Ivins, who spent 27 years studying anthrax at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick, Md., remain convinced of his innocence and believe the FBI erred in limiting the testing. Ivins was a researcher at (Fort D) and worked with the anthrax virus.
Of particular interest in the investigation is early evidence of a particular bacterial contaminant - bacillus subtilis. researchers determined that the contaminant was present in the anthrax letters sent to the media but were absent in the letters to Senators Daschle and Leahy who's offices received a more pure and deadly version of the anthrax.
Many believe that the presence of the contaminant is a critical part of the investigation but one that was overlooked by FBI investigators. Furthermore, at least one of Ivins' colleagues, Hugh-Jones a world expert on anthrax, doesn't believe he had the necessary skill to produce the powdered form of the anthrax.
One of the unnamed law enforcement officials said that the FBI arranged for extensive studies of B. subtilis. It also tested for, but didn't find the contaminant in a lab at the Army's Dugway Proving Ground in Utah, which years earlier grew anthrax that went into Ivins' flask and which also received anthrax from him, the official said. Tests also were conducted in work areas of unidentified parties who were under "under investigation," but weren't anthrax researchers, he said.
But once the four mutations in the mailed anthrax were linked to Ivins' flask, there seemed little value to testing the equipment, countertops and B. subtilis stocks in the labs of researchers whose anthrax didn't match Ivins' spores, another of the law enforcement officials said.
Jacques Ravel, a lab scientist who aided the FBI while with the Institute for Genomic Research in Rockville, Md., shrugged off the B. subtilis lead as "a long shot," saying that the contaminant is found "everywhere" in the air and soil and wasn't used much at the time by bio-weapons labs.
However, a 2004 paper in a science journal described a study of B. subtilis by researchers at Dugway, the Battelle Memorial Institute's operations at Dugway, and the Army's Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland. Unlike Ivins, researchers at Dugway and Battelle both worked with dry anthrax powder.
McClatchy
Adding more criticism to the FBI's conclusions in their report, Hugh-Jones and two other prominent scientists in the field identified the presence of yet another abnormal material in the anthrax attack samples and published their findings in a 2012 paper in the Journal of Bioterrorism & Biodefense.
Specifically, the paper highlights the existence of high levels of tin in the attack spores, something that is unique to the anthrax samples preserved from the attacks. Ultimately, their finding suggests that the attack spores 'require special expertise and sophisticated facilities'.
Abstract
The elemental composition of the 2001 attack anthrax presents critical clues that were not considered or were misinterpreted throughout the original investigation. Extensive experimental data released by the FBI after the anthrax case was closed make it possible to trace some of the implications of these clues: the substantial presence of tin, a toxic material that must have been added subsequent to growth, and a uniquely high content of silicon in the attack spores. No Bacillus spore preparations other than the attack anthrax have ever been found to contain such a high level of silicon, although some surrogate spore powders prepared at Dugway following FBI instructions have been cited as evidence that high levels of silicon can be reproduced; however, examination of the experimental data reveals that the silicon in these samples was unquestionably an artifact. The elemental evidence suggests that the attack spores had been coated with silicone (a polysiloxane) in the presence of tin, which catalyzes the cross-linking of polysiloxane chains needed to form an encapsulating coating on the spore coat. Microencapsulation helps protect biological agents from damage during atmospheric exposure and from the body’s defenses during infection, and would defeat some detection methods. Microencapsulation, which would explain the location and amounts of both tin and silicon in the attack spores, requires special expertise and sophisticated facilities. DOD-sponsored projects explicitly involving microencapsulation at DARPA, Dugway and perhaps elsewhere were spelled out publicly in budget documents in 1999 and thereafter, and executed at the very time of the anthrax attacks. Both the Dugway laboratory and Battelle Memorial Institute, a sub-contractor at Dugway, had extensive experience in making Bacillus spore powders; both had access to Bacillus anthracis genetically matching the attack spores; both could have made the attack spores legally for institutions conducting biodefense activities that required microencapsulated spores. Furthermore, a small but significant amount of tin, about 4% of that in the attack spores, has been found in some surrogate spore products made at Dugway. A measureable tin content has not been found in any other Bacillus spores except the attack spores. The tin in the Dugway surrogates may have been a remnant, indicative of earlier, classified work. Avoidance of government sponsored, classified research may account for some of the limitations of the investigation.
Evidence for the Source of the 2001 Attack Anthrax
Journal of Bioterrorism & Biodefense
Martin E. Hugh-Jones1*, Barbara Hatch Rosenberg2, and Stuart Jacobsen
The implications are that the discovery of silicone and tin coating of the spores may indicate that the production was on a higher level than Ivins' means and abilities. The only conceivable higher level of sophistication being found in classified military programs. If this is truly the case than Ivins may be innocent after all.
If the authors of the new paper are correct about the silicon-tin coating, it appears likely that Dr. Ivins could not have made the anthrax powder alone with the equipment he possessed, as the F.B.I. maintains. That would mean either that he got the powder from elsewhere or that he was not the perpetrator.
If Dr. Ivins did not make the powder, one conceivable source might be classified government research on anthrax, carried out for years by the military and the Central Intelligence Agency. Dr. Ivins had ties to several researchers who did such secret work.
https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/28/2874301_re-ct-os-us-ct-analysts-dispute-closing-of-anthrax-case-.html
Another curious aspect raised by those who believe that Ivins was not the evil mastermind he was portrayed to be by the FBI report, is if he had access to hundreds or of samples, why would he select a strain that pointed directly to himself (RMR-1029) and the laboratory where he worked at USMRIID? The story presented by the prosecution doesn't add up according to colleagues.
Sometime before the mailings, prosecutors theorize, Ivins withdrew a sample of anthrax from his flask—labeled RMR-1029—and began to grow large quantities of the deadly germ. If so, his choice of strains seemed inconsistent with the FBI’s portrait of him as a cunning killer. Surrounded by a veritable library of germs, they say, Ivins picked the Dugway Ames spores, a culture that was expressly under his control.
Using the Ames strain “pointed right at USAMRIID," said W. Russell Byrne, who preceded Andrews as the chief of the Bacteriology Division and who's among those convinced of Ivins’ innocence. “That was our bug."
Dugway Proving Ground
Stars and Stripes
Located in Utah, the Dugway Proving Ground is a major test facility for the U.S. Army's chemical and biological defense programs. It is located on 800,000 acres about 75 miles southwest of Salt Lake City.
In 2007, it was discovered that Dugway had mistakenly sent live anthrax to dozens of labs throughout the US and to international labs. Furthermore, the lab was faced potential sanctions for not properly disposing and eliminating specimens of deadly bacteria while simultaneously ignoring test results that showed the labs 'kill process' to be ineffectual. Despite the numerous safety violations the incident were not disclosed to Congressional oversight committees responsible for supervising laboratories engaged in the study of biological weapons and deadly pathogens.
Oversight of labs conducting research into deadly viruses and biological weapons continues to be problematic as much of the work is sheltered from direct supervision due to "national security". As many as 100 labs across the country working with "select agent" pathogens have faced some form of enforcement actions since 2003.
The government agency responsible for overseeing and regulating bioterror research facilities such as Dugway is the Federal Select Agent Program, which is jointly run by the CDC and the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
Congress requires the Federal Select Agent Program to report each year on incidents with bioterror pathogens in regulated labs. Yet [SIC] found the reports provide few details and only occasional vague information on a few serious incidents at unnamed labs. The reports, obtained under the federal Freedom of Information Act, do not include any incident description that matches Dugway's 2007 failure to kill anthrax specimens.
The Federal Select Agent Program refuses to release lab inspection reports, citing "national security" interests. The CDC said its lab inspectors identified no biosafety concerns when they visited Dugway in January 2015 for an announced renewal inspection. Dugway's institutional biosafety committee minutes, obtained under the federal Freedom of Information Act, show CDC inspectors cited the facility's labs for eight "observations" in 2013, but the minutes don't say what they were. CDC said Friday none of the 2013 infractions involved biosafety concerns. "The eight observations noted in the minutes you referenced had to do with missing references in the lab's standard operating procedures to work with specific select agents and toxins and inventory discrepancies," the CDC statement said
USA Today
A wide range of reporting on the research, development and storage of deadly pathogens and viruses conducted at Dugway Proving Grounds and at Fort Detrick USMRIID laboratories does not inspire confidence in the security of these facilities.
It paints a disturbing picture of negligence, carelessness, incompetence and serious lack of safety protocols necessary when dealing with deadly biological agents.
Moreover, it demonstrates quite clearly that biological agents and bioweapons stored at these research facilities could easily escape into the surrounding environments.
The unanswered questions and critiques of the investigation into the 2001 Anthrax Attacks also opens up the possibility that those responsible for the release of biological agent have not been found or brought to justice.
It also leaves open the possibility that an attack using a similarly designed bioterror pathogen could be used against a civilian population could be repeated.
From Anthrax to the Patriot Act
The Anthrax Attacks lead directly to the fast-tracking of the Patriot Act and its enshrinement into law without congressional or senatorial deliberation.
The threat of an invisible biological terror that could strike at any moment and infect any citizen paved the way for the erosion of the US constitution and civil rights.
In our present situation it's not difficult to see how a biological threat, or simply the fear of a biological contagion, could be used to accelerate and precipitate the further elimination of our civil liberties and constitutional rights.
Sources
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/06/12/dugway-live-anthrax-shipments/71093540/
https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/article24624502.html
https://www.propublica.org/article/new-evidence-disputes-case-against-bruce-e-ivins
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/73702-d1-doj-summary-errata-feb-19-2010-13067-13270
https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/amerithrax-or-anthrax-investigation
https://vault.fbi.gov/Amerithrax/
https://www.omicsonline.org/evidence-for-the-source-of-the-2001-attack-anthrax-2157-2526.S3-008.php?aid=10614
https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/28/2874301_re-ct-os-us-ct-analysts-dispute-closing-of-anthrax-case-.html
