Prof. Kathryn Weathersby
In the last post, we saw that the creation of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) in November 1947 brought to a head the simmering international disagreement over the Korea issue. Canadian Prime Minister MacKenzie King finally agreed to participate in UNTCOK, but only after President Truman argued forcefully that the very viability of the UN was at stake. King nonetheless remained so concerned about the illegitimacy of UNTCOK elections that he qualified his commitment. He stipulated that If the Soviets did not cooperate with UNTCOK-sponsored elections, the Commission must return its mandate to the United Nations or the Canadian representative would withdraw.
Other UN members held out hope that the Soviets would not defy coordinated pressure from the international community and would therefore allow unification of Korea in 1948. Moscow soon proved them wrong, however. The Soviet republics of Ukraine and Belarus were UN members on their own, even though they were part of the Soviet Union, because of the deal Stalin negotiated when the UN was created in 1945. Now, as the Korea issue peaked in late 1947, Stalin made use of this facade of Ukrainian autonomy. To protect Moscow from the political fallout, Ukraine announced that it would not participate in the work of UNTCOK. American officials then responded by insisting to the Commission that it had the power to hold elections in the southern zone alone.
Whatever the UNTCOK representatives’ views of the American argument, when the group arrived in Korea in January, it immediately decided to send each occupation commander a request that they cooperate with the Commission. UNTCOK also organized itself into two committees. One was responsible for ensuring a free atmosphere in Korea, though how they were to accomplish such a formidable task was not specified. The second was to carry out the task the earlier Joint Soviet/American Commission had failed to complete, which was to determine which Korean leaders would consult with the Commission.
Predictably, General Hodge responded positively to the Commission’s request. He pledged full cooperation, and also provided its members with office space, housing, transportation, and food. Soviet Commander Korotkov, on the other hand, simply ignored UNTCOK’s request. This inaction prompted UN General Secretary Trygve Lie to intervene, appealing to the Soviet delegation in New York to cooperate with the Commission. The head of the Soviet delegation, future foreign minister Andrei Gromyko, was unmoved; he simply reminded Lie that the Soviet Union had already expressed its negative attitude toward UNTCOK’s activities. In response, the American permanent representative to the UN, Warren Austin, urged Lie to agree that UNTCOK would hold elections in southern Korea alone.
Soviet intransigence prompted Korean political leaders to intercede with UNTCOK and take their case to the public. Believing the South was in danger of communist takeover, Syngman Rhee demanded separate elections and the creation of a security force. Kim Kyu-sik, however, opposed internationally supervised elections in the southern zone since this would solidify the division of Korea. He insisted that unity could only be achieved by Koreans themselves and began to mobilize support for convening a North-South Conference to end the division of the country. Significantly, Kim Ku broke with Rhee Syngman and announced opposition to anything less than nationwide elections.
Kim Kyu-sik took his argument directly to UNTCOK. Speaking before the Commission, he argued forcefully that if the Soviets refused access to the northern zone, the Commission should refer the matter back to the UN Interim Committee for reconsideration. Several Commission members were persuaded by his argument and urged that UNTCOK’sr work be postponed until they could confer with the UN Interim Committee.
In the next post, we will look at the serious violence that erupted in the south in the wake of UNTCOK’s arrival and how the governing body in the North responded to the presence of the Commission.
[Sources: This post relies, in part, on James I. Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950 (University of Hawaii Press, 1985).]
Sponsored ( Powered by dclick )
Introducing DCLICK: An Incentivized Ad platform by Proof of Click. - Steem based AdSense.
Hello, Steemians. Let us introduce you a new Steem B...
This posting was written via
dclick the Ads platform based on Steem Blockchain.