Section 18
An Analysis of the Individual Self (the Self and Phenomena) In 12 verses
If the individual self (atma) were identical to the "groups" (skandha), then it would partake of origination and destruction.
If the individual self were different from the "groups," then it would be without the characteristics of the "groups."
If the individual self does not exist, how then will there be something which is "my own"?
There is lack of possessiveness and no ego on account of the cessation of self and that which is "my own."
He who is without possessiveness and who has no ego — He, also, does not exist.
Whoever sees "he who is without possessiveness" or "he who has no ego" really does not see.
When "I" and "mine" have stopped, then also there is not an outside nor an inner self.
The "acquiring" of karma (upadana) is stopped; on account of that destruction, there is destruction of verse existence.
On account of the destruction of the pains (klesa) of action there is release for pains of action exist for him who constructs them.
These pains result from phenomenal extension (prapanca); but this phenomenal extension comes to a stop by emptiness.
When the domain of thought has been dissipated, "that which can be stated" is dissipated.
Those things which are un-originated and not terminated, like nirvana, constitute the Truth (dharmata).
Everything is "actual" (tathyam) or "not-actual," or both "acts actual-and-not-actual,"
Or "neither-actual-nor-not-actual":
This is the teaching of the Buddha.
"Not caused by something else," "peaceful," "not elaborated by discursive thought,"
"Indeterminate," "undifferentiated": such are the characteristics of true reality (tattva).
Whatever exists, being dependent on something else, is certainly not identical to that other thing,
Nor is a thing different from that; therefore, it is neither destroyed nor eternal.
The immortal essence of the teaching of the Buddhas, the lords of the world, is
Without singleness or multiplicity; it is not destroyed nor is it eternal.
If fully-developed Buddhas do not arise in the world and the disciples of the Buddha disappear,
Then, independently, the knowledge of the self-produced enlightened ones (Pratyekabuddha) is produced.
Section 19
An Analysis of Time (Time) In 6 verses
If "the present" and "future" exist presupposing "the past,"
"The present" and "future" will exist in "the past."
If "the present" and "future" did not exist there in "the past",
How could "the present" and "future" exist presupposing that "past?
Without presupposing "the past" the two things "the present" and "future" cannot be proved to exist.
Therefore neither present nor future time exist.
In this way the remaining two times can be inverted.
Thus one would regard "highest," "lowest" and "middle," etc., as oneness and difference. (or "after," "before" and "middle", or "right," "left" and "middle" …)
A non-stationary "time" cannot be "grasped"; and a stationary "time" which can be grasped does not exist.
How, then, can one perceive time if it is not "grasped"?
Since time is dependent on a thing (bhava), how can time exist without a thing?
There is not any thing which exists; how, then, will time become something?
Section 20
An Analysis of the Aggregate of Causes and Conditions (cause and effect) In 24 verses
If a product (phala) is produced through the aggregate of causes and conditions,
And exists in an aggregate, how will it be produced in the aggregate?
If a product is produced in the aggregate of causes and conditions,
And does not exist in the aggregate, how will it be produced in the aggregate?
If the product is in the aggregate of causes and conditions,
Would it not be "grasped" i.e., located in the aggregate? But it is not "grasped" in the aggregate.
If the product is not in the aggregate of causes and conditions,
Then the causes and conditions would be the same as non-causes and non-conditions.
If a cause, having given the cause for a product, is stopped,
Then that which is "given" and that which is stopped would be two identities of the cause.
If a cause without having given the cause for a product is stopped
Then, the cause being stopped, the product would be produced as something derived from a non-cause (ahetuka).
If the product would become visible concomitantly with the aggregate of causes and conditions,
Then it would logically follow that the producer and that which is produced exist in the same moment.
If the product would become visible before the aggregate,
Then the product, without being related to causes and conditions, would be something derived from a non-cause.
If, when the cause of the product is stopped, there would be a continuation of the cause,
It would logically follow that there would be another production of the previous producing cause.
How can that which is stopped, i.e., something which has disappeared, produce the arising of a product?
How could a cause which is enclosed by its product, even though it persists, originate that product?
Or if that cause were not enclosed by the product, which product would it produce?
For the cause does not produce the product, having seen or not having seen the product.
There is no concomitance of a past product with a past cause, a future cause or present cause.
Certainly there is no concomitance of the present product with future cause, past cause or present cause.
Certainly there is no concomitance of a future product with a present cause, future cause or past cause.
If there is no concomitance whatever, how would the cause produce the product?
Or if a concomitance exists, how would the cause produce the product?
If the cause is empty of a product, how would it produce the product?
If the cause is not empty of a product, how would it produce the product?
A non-empty product would not be originated, and a non-empty product would not be destroyed.
Then that is non-empty which will not originate or not disappear.
How would that be produced which is empty?
How would that be destroyed which is empty?
It logically follows, then, that which is empty is not originated and not destroyed.
Certainly a oneness of cause and product is not possible at all.
Nor is a difference of cause and product possible at all.
If there were a oneness of the cause and product, then there would be an identity of the originator and what is originated.
If there were a difference of product and cause, then a cause would be the same as that which is not a cause.
Can a cause produce a product which is essentially existing in itself (svabhva) ?
Can a cause produce a product which is not essentially existing in itself (svabhava) ?
It is not possible to have "what is by its nature a cause" (hetutva) of "that which is not producing."
If "what is by its nature a cause" is not possible, whose product will exist?
How will that aggregate of causes and conditions produce a product when
That which is the aggregate of causes and conditions does not produce itself by itself?
The product is not produced by the aggregate;
nor is the product not produced by the aggregate.
Without the product, how is there an aggregate of conditions?
Section 21
An Analysis of Origination and Disappearance (coming to be and passing away) In 21 verses
There is no disappearance either with origination or without it.
There is no origination either with disappearance or without it.
How, indeed, will disappearance exist at all without origination?
How could there be death without birth?
There is no disappearance without prior origination.
How can disappearance exist concomitantly with origination?
Since, surely, death does not exist at the same moment as birth.
How, indeed, will origination exist at all without disappearance?
For, impermanence does not fail to be found in existent things ever.
How can origination exist concomitantly with disappearance?
Since, surely, death does not exist at the same moment as birth.
When two things cannot be proved either separately or together,
No proof exists of those two things.
How can these two things be proved?
There is no origination of that which is destructible, nor of that which is not-destructible.
There is no disappearance of that which is destructible nor of that which is non-destructible.
Origination and disappearance cannot exist without an existent thing.
Without origination and disappearance an existent thing does not exist.
Origination and disappearance does not obtain for that which is empty.
Origination and disappearance does not obtain for that which is non-empty.
It does not obtain that origination and disappearance are the same thing.
It does not obtain that origination and disappearance are different.
You argue: Origination, as well as disappearance, is seen.
Therefore it would exist for you.
But origination and disappearance are seen due to a delusion.
An existent thing does not originate from another thing;
and an existent thing does not originate from a non-existent thing.
Also, a non-existent thing does not originate from another non-existent thing;
and a non-existent thing does not originate from an existent thing.
An existent thing does not originate either by itself or by something different.
Or by itself and something different at the same time. How, then, can it be produced?
For someone assuming an existent thing, either an Eternalistic or nihilistic point of view would logically follow,
For that existent thing would be either eternal or liable to cessation.
An opponent objects:
For someone assuming an existent thing, there is not only Eternalism or nihilism,
Since this is existence: namely, the continuity of the originating and stopping of causes and product.
Nargarjuna replies:
If this is existence: namely, the continuity of originating and stopping of causes and product,
It would logically follow that the cause is destroyed because the destroyed thing does not originate again.
If there is self-existence of something which is intrinsically existing, then non-existence does not obtain.
At the time of nirvana there is destruction of the cycle of existence (bhavasamtana) as a result of the cessation.
If the last part of existence is destroyed, the first part of existence does not obtain.
If the last part of existence is not destroyed, the first part of existence does not obtain.
If the first part of existence were produced while the final part were being destroyed,
There would be one thing being destroyed and being produced both at the same time.
If the one "being destroyed" and the one "being produced" cannot exist together,
Can someone be produced in those "groups of universal elements" (skandhas) in which he is also "dying"?
Thus, the chain of existences is not possible in any of the tree times i.e. past, present, and future;
And if it does not exist in the three times, how can the chain of existences exist?
Section 22
An Analysis of the "Fully Completed" (Tathágata-- the Buddha) In 16 verses
That one who is "fully-completed" is not the "groups of universal elements" (skandha),
nor something other than the "groups";
the "groups" are not in him, nor is he in them;
The "fully completed" does not possess the "groups."
What, then, is the "fully completed"?
If the Buddha exists dependent on the "groups," then he is not "that which exists by itself" (svabbava)
And how can he exist as something else (parabhava) ("other-existence") if he is not "that which exists by itself" (svabbava)?
That which exists presupposing another existent thing is properly called a "non-individual self" (anatma).
How will that which is a non-individual self become the "fully completed"?
And if there is no self-existence (svabhava), how would it have an "other-existence" (parabhava)?
What would that "fully completed" reality be without either a self-existence or other-existence?
If some kind of "fully completed" thing would exist without dependence on the "groups,"
It is dependent now; therefore it exists dependent on something.
There is no kind of "fully completed" being which is not dependent on the "groups."
And whatever is not non-dependent—how will it become dependent?
There is nothing whatever that is dependent on the "groups" and there is no thing whatever on which something does not depend.
There would not exist in any way a "fully completed" being without being dependent on the "groups".
That fully completed being which does not exist by its actual reality (tattva) or by some other reality (anyatva) according to the five-fold examination—
How is the "fully completed" being perceived by being dependent?
So when there is dependence, self-existence does not exist;
And if there is no self-existence whatever, how is an other-existence possible?
Thus "dependence" and "that which is dependent" are completely empty (sunya).
How is that empty "fully completed one" known through that which is empty?
One may not say that there is "emptiness" (sunya) (1)
nor that there is non-emptiness. (2)"
Nor that both exist simultaneously (3),
nor that neither exists (4);
the purpose for saying "emptiness" is for the purpose of conveying knowledge.
How, then, will "eternity," "non-eternity," and the rest of the Tetralemma apply to bliss (santa)?
How, then, will "the end," "without end," and the rest of the Tetralemma apply to bliss?
That image of nirvana in which the Buddha (Tathágata) either "is" or "is not"—
By him who so imagines nirvana the notion is crudely grasped.
Concerning that which is empty by its own nature (svabhava), the thoughts do not arise that:
The Buddha "exists" or "does not exist" after death.
Those who describe in detail the Buddha, who is unchanging and beyond all detailed description—
Those, completely defeated by description, do not perceive the "fully completed" being.
The self-existence of the "fully completed" being is the self-existence of the world.
The "fully completed" being is without self-existence and the world is without self-existence.
Section 23
An Analysis of Errors (the perverted views) In 25 verses
It is said that desire (raga), hate, and delusion are derived from mental fabrication (samkalpa),
Because they come into existence presupposing errors as to what is salutary and un-salutary.
Those things which come into existence presupposing errors as to what is salutary and un-salutary
Do not exist by their own nature (svabhava); therefore the impurities (klesa) do not exist in reality.
The existence or non-existence of the individual self (atma) is not proved at all.
Without that individual self, how can the existence or non-existence of the impurities be proved?
For impurities exist of somebody, and that person is not proved at all.
Is it not so that without someone the impurities do not exist of anybody?
In reference to the view of having a body of one's own, the impurities do not exist in what is made impure according to the five-fold manner.
In reference to the view of having a body of one's own, that which is made impure does not exist in the impurities according to the five-fold manner.
The errors as to what is salutary and non-salutary do not exist as self-existent entities (svabhavatas)
Depending on which errors as to what is salutary and non-salutary are then impurities?
Form, sound, taste, touch, smell, and the dharmas: this six-fold
Substance (vastu) of desire, hate, and delusion is imagined.
Form, sound, taste, touch, smell, and the dharmas are
Merely the form of a fairy castle, like a mirage, a dream.
How will "that which is salutary" or "that which is non-salutary" come into existence
In a formation of a magical man, or in things like a reflection?
We submit that there is no non-salutary thing unrelated to a salutary thing.
And in turn depending on which, there is a salutary thing; therefore, a salutary thing does not obtain.
We submit that there is no salutary thing unrelated to a non-salutary thing,
And in turn depending on which, there is a non-salutary thing; therefore a non-salutary thing does not obtain.
If "what is salutary" does not exist, how will there be desire for it?
And if "what is non-salutary" does not exist, how will there be hatred for it?
Even if the notion "What is permanent is in something impermanent" is in error,
How can this notion be in error since "what is impermanent" does not exist in emptiness?
Even if the notion "what is permanent is in something impermanent" is in error,
Is not then the notion concerning emptiness, i.e., that it is impermanent, in error?
That by which a notion is formed, the notion, those who have notions, and that which is grasped in the notion:
All have ceased; therefore, the notion does not exist.
If a notion is not existing either as false or true,
Whose is the error? Whose is the non-error?
Nor do errors of someone who has erred come into existence.
Nor do errors of someone who has not erred come into existence.
And errors of someone who is at present in error do not come into existence.
Now you examine of whom do errors really come into existence!
How in all the world will errors which have not originated come into existence?
And if errors are not originated, how can there be someone involved in error?
Since no being is produced by itself, nor by something different,
Nor by itself and something different at the same time, how can there be someone involved in error?
If the individual self, "what is pure," "what is eternal," and happiness really exist,
Then the individual self, "what is pure," "what is eternal," and happiness are not errors.
But if individual self, "what is pure," "what is eternal," and happiness do not exist,
Then non-individual self, "what is impure," "what is impermanent" and sorrow (dukkha) do not exist.
From the cessation of error ignorance ceases;
When ignorance has ceased, conditioning forces (samskara) and everything else cease.
If any kind of self-existent impurities belong to somebody,
How in all the world would they be eliminated? Who can eliminate that which is self-existent?
If any kind of self-existent impurities do not belong to somebody,
How in all the world would they be eliminated? Who can eliminate that which is non-self-existent?
Section 24
An Analysis of the Holy Truths (the noble truths) In 40 verses
If everything is empty, there is no origination nor destruction.
Then you must incorrectly conclude that there is non-existence of the four holy truths.
If there is non-existence of the four holy truths, the saving knowledge, the elimination of illusion,
The "becoming" enlightened (bhávaná), and the "realization" of the goal are impossible.
If there is non-existence, then also the four holy "fruits" do not exist.
In the non-existence of fruit there is no "residing in fruit" nor obtaining.
When the community of Buddhists does not exist, then those eight "kinds of persons" i.e., four abiding in the fruit and four who are obtaining do not exist.
Because there is non-existence of the four holy truths, the real dharma does not exist.
And if there are no dharma and community, how will the Buddha exist?
By speaking thus, that everything is empty certainly you deny the three jewels i.e., the Buddha, the dharma, and the community.
You deny the real existence of a product, of right and wrong,
And all the practical behavior of the world as being empty.
We reply that you do not comprehend the point of emptiness;
You eliminate both "emptiness" itself and its purpose from it.
The teaching by the Buddhas of the dharma has recourse to two truths:
The world-ensconced truth and the truth which is the highest sense.
Those who do not know the distribution (vibhagam) of the two kinds of truth
Do not know the profound "point" (tattva) in the teaching of the Buddha.
The highest sense of the truth is not taught apart from practical behavior,
And without having understood the highest sense one cannot understand nirvana.
Emptiness, having been dimly perceived, utterly destroys the slow-witted.
It is like a snake wrongly grasped or magical knowledge incorrectly applied.
Therefore the mind of the ascetic Gautama was diverted from teaching the dharma,
Having thought about the incomprehensibility of the dharma by the stupid.
Time and again you have made a condemnation of emptiness,
But that refutation does not apply to our emptiness.
When emptiness "works", then everything in existence "works". (A)
If emptiness "does not work", then all existence "does not work". (B)
You, while projecting your own faults on us, (i.e. objectifying emptiness)
Are like a person who, having mounted his horse, forgot the horse! (i.e. a tool)
If you recognize real existence on account of the self-existence of things,
You perceive that there are uncaused and unconditioned things.
You deny "what is to be produced," cause, the producer, the instrument of production, and the producing action,
And the origination, destruction, and "fruit."
The "originating dependently" we call "emptiness";
This apprehension, i.e., taking into account all other things, is the understanding of the middle way.
Since there is no dharma whatever originating independently,
No dharma whatever exists which is not empty.
If all existence is not empty, there is neither origination nor destruction.
You must wrongly conclude then that the four holy truths do not exist.
Having originated without being conditioned, how will sorrow (dukkha) come into existence?
It is said that sorrow (dukkha) is not eternal; therefore, certainly it does not exist by its own nature (svabbava).
How can that which is existing by its own nature originate again?
For him who denies emptiness there is no production.
There is no destruction of sorrow (dukkha) if it exists by its own nature.
By trying to establish "self-existence" you deny destruction.
If the path of release is self-existent, then there is no way of bringing it into existence (bhávaná);
If that path is brought into existence, then "self-existence," which you claim does not exist.
When sorrow (dukkha), origination, and destruction do not exist,
What kind of path will obtain the destruction of sorrow (dukkha)?
If there is no complete knowledge as to self-existence, how can there be any knowledge of it?
Indeed, is it not true that self-existence is that which endures?
As in the case of complete knowledge, neither destruction, realization, "bringing into existence,"
Nor are the four holy fruits possible for you.
If you accept "self-existence," and a "fruit" is not known by its self-existence,
How can it be known at all?
In the non-existence of "fruit," there is no "residing in fruit" nor obtaining the "fruit";
When the community of Buddhists does not exist, then those eight "kinds of persons" do not exist.
Because there is non-existence of the four holy truths, the real dharma does not exist.
And if there is no dharma and community, how will the Buddha exist?
For you, either the one who is enlightened (Buddha) comes into being independent of enlightenment,
Or enlightenment comes into being independent of the one who is enlightened.
For you, some one who is a non-Buddha by his own nature (svabhava) but strives for enlightenment (i.e. a Bodhisattva)
Will not attain the enlightenment though the "way of life of becoming fully enlightened."
Neither the dharma nor non-dharma will be done anywhere.
What is produced which is non-empty? Certainly self-existence is not produced.
Certainly, for you, there is a product without the distinction of dharma or non-dharma.
Since, for you, the product caused by dharma or non-dharma does not exist.
If, for you, the product is caused by dharma or non-dharma, be non-empty?
How can that product, being originated by dharma or non-dharma empty?
You deny all mundane and customary activities
When you deny emptiness in the sense of dependent co-origination (patytya-samutpada).
If you deny emptiness, there would be action which is un-activated.
There would be nothing whatever acted upon, and a producing action would be something not begun.
According to the doctrine of "self-existence" the world is free from different conditions;
Then it will exist as un-produced, undestroyed and immutable.
If non-emptiness does not exist, then something is attained which is not attained;
There is cessation of sorrow (dukkha) and actions, and all evil is destroyed.
He who perceives dependent co-origination (patytya-samutpada)
Also understands sorrow (dukkha), origination, and destruction as well as the path of release.
Section 25
An Analysis of Nirvana In 24 verses
(Which may originally have been the final chapter.)
If all existence is empty, there is no origination nor destruction.
Then whose nirvana through elimination of suffering and destruction of illusion would be postulated?
If all existence is non-empty, there is no origination nor destruction.
Then whose nirvana through elimination of suffering and destruction of illusion would be postulated?
Nirvana has been said to be neither eliminated nor attained, neither annihilated nor eternal,
Neither disappeared nor originated.
Nirvana is certainly not an existing thing, for then it would be characterized by old age and death. In consequence it would involve the error that an existing thing would not become old and be without death.
And if nirvana is an existing thing, nirvana would be a constructed product (samskrta),
Since never ever has an existing thing been found to be a non-constructed-product (asamskrta).
But if nirvana is an existing thing, how could nirvana exist without dependence on something else?
Certainly nirvana does not exist as something without dependence.
If nirvana is not an existing thing, will nirvana become a non-existing thing?
Wherever there is no existing thing, neither is there a non-existing thing.
But if nirvana is a non-existing thing, how could nirvana exist without dependence on something else?
Certainly nirvana is not a non-existing thing, which exists without dependence.
That state which is the rushing in and out of existence when dependent or conditioned—
This state, when not dependent or not conditioned, is seen to be nirvana.
The teacher Gautama has taught that a "becoming" and a "non-becoming" (vibhava) are destroyed;
Therefore it obtains that: Nirvana is neither an existent thing nor a non-existent thing.
If nirvana were both an existent and a non-existent thing,
Final release (moksa) would be both an existent and a non-existent thing; but that is not possible.
If nirvana were both an existent and a non-existent thing,
There would be no nirvana without conditions, for these both operate with conditions.
How can nirvana exist as both an existent thing and a non-existent thing,
For nirvana is a non-composite-product (asamskrta), while both an existent thing and a non-existent thing are composite products (samskrta).
How can nirvana exist as both an existent and a non-existent thing?
There is no existence of both at one and the same place, as in the case of both darkness and light.
The assertion: "Nirvana is neither an existent thing nor a non-existent thing"
Is proved if the assertion: "It is an existent thing and a non-existent thing" were proved.
If nirvana is neither an existent thing nor a non-existent thing,
Who can really arrive at the assertion: "neither an existent thing nor a non-existent thing"?
It is not expressed if the Glorious One the Buddha exists (1) after his death,
Or does not exist (2), or both (3) or neither (4).
Also, it is not expressed if the Glorious One exists (1) while remaining in the world,
Or does not exist (2), or both (3) or neither (4).
There is nothing whatever which differentiates the existence-in-flux (samsara) from nirvana;
And there is nothing whatever which differentiates nirvana from existence-in-flux.
The extreme limit (koti) of nirvana is also the extreme limit of existence-in-flux;
There is not the slightest bit of difference between these two.
The views regarding whether that which is beyond death is limited by a beginning or an end or some other alternative
Depend on a nirvana limited by a beginning (purvanta) and an end (aparanta),
Since all dharmas are empty, what is finite ? What is infinite ?
What is both finite and infinite ? What is neither finite nor infinite ?
Is there anything which is this or something else, which is permanent or impermanent,
Which is both permanent and impermanent, or which is neither ?
The cessation of accepting everything as real is a salutary (siva) cessation of phenomenal development (prapanca);
No dharma anywhere has been taught by the Buddha of anything.
Section 26
An Analysis of the Twelve Components (the twelve spokes) In 12 verses
"What is hidden by ignorance (1)" (avidyanivrta) has caused the three kinds of conditioned things (2) (samskara) to be made for rebirth —
By those actions it i.e., " what is hidden by ignorance" goes forward.
Consciousness (3), presupposing that which is conditioned (samskara), enters on its course.
When consciousness is begun, the "name-and-form'- (namarupa) (4) is instilled.
When the "name-and-form" is instilled, the six domains of sense perceptions (5) (ayatana) are produced.
Having arrived at the six domains of sense perceptions, the process of perception begins to function.
Consciousness begins to function presupposing the eye, the visual forms, and ability of mental association—
Presupposing "name-and-form."
That which is the coincidence (6) (samnipata) of visual form, consciousness, and the eye:
That is sensual perception; and from perception, sensation (7) begins to function.
"Craving (8)" (trsna) for existing things is conditioned by sensation.
Certainly a person craves for the sake of sensation. The one who craves acquires the four-fold acquisition (9) (upadana) namely sexual pleasure, false views, ascetic morality and vows, and the doctrine of self-existence.
When the acquisition exists, the acquirer begins to function (10) (i.e. existence, becoming).
If he were someone without acquisition, that being would be released, and would not exist.
That being is the five "groups of universal elements" (skandha). Because of a being, birth (11) begins to function.
Growing old, dying, sorrow (dukkha) (12), etc., grief and regrets,
Despair and agitation: all this results from birth;
That "produced being" is a single mass of sorrows (dukkha).
Thus the ignorant people construct the conditioned things (samskara); that is the source for existence-in-flux.
The one who constructs is ignorant; the wise person is not one who constructs because he perceives true reality.
When ignorance ceases, the constructed phenomena do not come into existence.
A person's cessation of ignorance proceeds on the basis of "becoming" enlightened through knowledge.
Through cessation of every component none functions;
That single mass of sorrow (dukkha) is thus completely destroyed.
Section 27
An Analysis of the Views About Reality (dogmas) In 30 verses
Those views relating to the limits of the past reality are: "The world is eternal," etc.,
And "I have existed in the past," "I have not existed in the past," etc.
The assertion: "I will not become something different in a future time,"
"I will become something different," and the alternative, etc., are relating to an end in the future.
The assertion: "I existed in a past time (1)" does not obtain,
Since this present being is not (i.e. "ii" is not the same as "i") that one who was in a former birth.
Were he in a previous birth, that individual self (atma) which he acquires in coming into existence would be different.
Moreover, what kind of individual self is there without acquisition (upadana)?
If it were held that: "There is no individual self without the acquisition,"
Then the individual self would be only the acquisition or it is not an individual self at all.
The individual self is not the acquisition, since that acquisition appears and disappears.
Now really, how will "he who acquires" become "that which is acquired?
Moreover, it does not obtain that the individual self is different from the acquisition.
If the individual self were different, it would be perceived without the acquisition; but in fact it is not so perceived.
Thus that individual self is not different from nor identical to the acquisition.
The individual self is not without acquisition; but there is no certainty that "It does not exist."
The assertion: "I have not existed in a past time (2)" does not obtain,
For that one now living is not different (i.e. "ii" is not different than "i") from that one who was in a former birth.
If that present person were different, he would exist in exclusion of that former one.
Therefore either that former person persists, or he would be born eternal!
-- note 4 : Verse 11 is not available in the Sanskrit test, but it is known from the Tibetan translation
There is no existing thing which is "that which has not existed prior." Therefore, the error logically follows that
Either the individual self is "what is produced" or it originates without a cause.
Thus the view concerning the past which asserts "I have existed (1)," or "I have not existed (2),"
Both "existed and not existed" (3) or neither (4): this does not obtain at all.
The views: "I will become something in a future time (1'),"
Or "I will not become (2') something," etc. (3') (4'), should be considered like those views of the past.
If "This is a man, this is a god" obtains, then eternity (i) exists,
For god is un-produced, and certainly something eternal would not be born.
If man is different from god, there would exist something non-eternal (ii).
If man is different from god, then a continuity does not obtain. (i.e. they cannot be different)
If one part were divine and another part human, (i.e. a man with an eternal soul)
Then there would be something non-eternal together with that which is eternal (iii); but that is not possible.
If something both non-eternal and eternal were proved,
Then, no doubt, something "neither eternal nor non-eternal (iv)" is proved.
If someone, having come from somewhere, in some way goes somewhere again,
Then there would be existence-in-flux with no beginning; but this is not the case.
If someone who is eternal does not exist, who will exist being non-eternal,
Or who being both eternal and non-eternal, or devoid of these two characteristics ?
If the world would come to an end, how would an other-world come into existence?
If the world would not come to an end, how would an other-world come into being?
Since the continuity of the "groups of universal elements" (skandhas) from one moment to the next functions like flames of lamps,
The view: "both having an end and not having an end" is not possible.
If the former "groups" would disappear, those new "groups" which are dependent on those former "groups" would not arise;
Therefore, the world would come to an end (ii).
If the former "groups" would not disappear, these new "groups" which are dependent on those former "groups" would not arise;
Therefore, the world would be eternal (i).
If one part were finite and the other were infinite,
The world would be both finite and infinite (iii); but this is not possible.
Therefore, how can it be that one part of "one who acquires" karma will be destroyed, (i.e. the body – man ?)
And one part not destroyed? (i.e. the very subtle mind -- the divine part ?) This is not possible.
How, indeed, can it be that one part of the acquisition of karma (i.e. the learning stored in the body) will be destroyed,
And one part not destroyed? (i.e. the learning stored in the mind) That, certainly does not obtain.
If the view "both finite and infinite" were proved,
Then no doubt, "neither finite nor infinite" (i.e. nothing at all) could be proved.
Because of the emptiness of all existing things,
How will the views about "eternity," etc., come into existence, about what, of whom, and of what kind?
To him, possessing compassion, who taught the real dharma
For the destruction of all views—to him, Gautama, I humbly offer reverence.